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This paper argues that incompleteness of intertemporal ﬁnancial markets
has little effect (on welfare, prices, or consumptions) in an economy with a
single consumption good, provided that traders are long-lived and patient, a
riskless bond is traded, shocks are transitory, and there is no aggregate risk.
In an economy with aggregate risk, a similar conclusion holds, provided
traders share the same CRRA utility function and the right assets are traded.
Examples demonstrate that these conclusions need not hold if the wrong
assets are traded or if the economy has multiple consumption goods.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers D41, D51
Keywords inﬁnite horizon economies, incomplete markets, law of large
numbers, consumption smoothing, permanent income hypothesis1 Introduction
Does market incompleteness matter — for welfare, for prices, for consumption?
If the time horizon is short, market incompleteness generally will matter because
it entails the inability to insure against risk. But when the time horizon is long,
intuition suggests that market incompleteness may not matter if traders can self-
insure — borrowing in bad times, saving in good times. This paper presents a
rigorous, theoretical look at this intuition in a general equilibrium setting. Our
focus is on welfare, but our analysis has implications for prices and consumption
as well.
We frame our analysis in an inﬁnite horizon exchange economy, populated
by inﬁnitely-lived traders.1 Intertemporal trade in our model economy is accom-
plished through short-lived real assets. Traders maximize discounted expected
utility of their consumption stream, using a common subjective discount factor.2
We treat traders’ common discount factor as a parameter, and ask about the wel-
fare losses of market incompleteness as the discount factor tends to 1. (Our em-
phasis on asymptotic behavior is in the spirit of the Folk Theorem for inﬁnitely re-
peatedgames.) We showinTheoremAthatmarketincompletenesswillnotmatter
(in the sense that welfare losses tend to 0 as the discount factor tends to 1), pro-
vided shocks are transitory and purely idiosyncratic (so there is no aggregate risk),
and that only a single consumption good is traded. This conclusion is robust to
assumptions about consumer preferences (we assume only that utility is separable
over time and that the ﬁrst derivatives of period utility functions are convex) and
to assumptions about the asset structure (we assume only that riskless bonds are
traded at each date-event; the asset structure is otherwise arbitrary).3 On the other
1Our conclusions would be much the same in a ﬁnite horizon world, provided we were to treat
both the length of the horizon and the discount factor of traders as parameters; the inﬁnite horizon
framework seems more natural and is deﬁnitely more convenient. Another alternative would be to
consider an inﬁnite horizon world populated by overlapping generations of ﬁnitely lived traders.
Analysis of such a model would be complicated by the need to treat both the discount factor of
traders and the length of their lifetimes as parameters, but we believe the conclusions would be
similar to those obtained here.
2Because Ponzi schemes must be ruled out, the deﬁnition and existence of equilibrium are
subtle issues. We rely here on Levine and Zame (1996); Magill and Quinzii (1994) provide an
equivalent formulation.
3Much of the literature assumes a speciﬁc asset structure; typically riskless bonds only, or
equity only, or riskless bonds plus equity only. The fact that we allow for arbitrary asset structures
seems important to us, since adding assets may be Pareto worsening.
1hand, this conclusion is fragile to each of the other assumptions. In particular,
we show in Examples 1 and 2 that market incompleteness may matter when there
is aggregate risk (even when other stringent conditions are met), and we show
in Example 3 that market incompleteness may matter when there is more than
one consumption good. (Constantinides and Dufﬁe (1996) have shown that mar-
ket incompleteness may matter if shocks are permanent.) Market incompleteness
matters in Examples 1 and 2 because aggregate risk affects prices; in particular,
it drives up the riskless interest rate, making borrowing constraints tighter. Mar-
ket incompleteness matters in Example 3 because relative price effects provide
an additional, untraded source of risk.4 Finally, we provide in Theorem B some
(strong) sufﬁcient conditions on preferences, endowments and the asset structure
in order that market incompleteness not matter in a one-good exchange economy
with both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk; a crucial condition is that the market
for aggregate risk is complete.
Of course, the idea that patient consumers can self-insure is not a new one. A
familiar partial equilibrium expression of this idea is due to Yaari (1976). Yaari
analyzestheoptimal lifetime consumptionpatternof aperfectlypatienttraderwho
lives a long (ﬁnite) lifetime, faces an i.i.d. endowment stream, and can borrow and
save risklesslyat a 0 interest rate. Yaari shows that, as the trader’s lifetime tends to
inﬁnity, the optimal consumption plan converges to constant average consumption
and the (per period average) utility of the optimal consumption plan converges to
the utility of constant average consumption. Our Theorem A parallels Yaari’s
work (and rests, in a similar way, on the Law of Large Numbers), but there are a
number of important differences. First, and most importantly, Yaari treats a one-
consumer optimization problem, while we treat an equilibrium problem. Second,
Yaari allows consumption to be negative, while we require consumption to be
non-negative. Thus Yaari’s consumers do not face borrowing constraints, while
ours do. As we shall see, these borrowing constraints play an important role in
our analysis.5 Third, Yaari assumes that the riskless interest rate is 0, while we
derive the riskless interest rate. In our context, the riskless interest rate cannot be
much above 0, but might be much below 0. This has important consequences for
the form of the alternative plans we use to provide lower bounds on equilibrium
utilities. Because interest rates are different from 0, these plans must maintain a
4To insure against price risk in such a setting, it would appear that traders would require access
to assets whose dividends depend on prices.
5The possibility of negative consumption is crucial to Yaari’s conclusion that the consumer’s
optimal consumption plan converges to constant average consumption.
2delicatebalancebetweenconsumptionsmoothingandthegrowthofdebt. Because
interest rates might be negative, these plans call for consumers to borrow when
necessary and repay when possible — but not to save. (Keep in mind that we
are discussing alternative feasible plans, not equilibrium plans. At equilibrium, of
course, market clearing means that when some traders borrow others must save.)
The implications of market incompleteness have been the subject of much in-
terest in the macroeconomics/ﬁnance literature, but the focus there has been on
prices, rather than on welfare. Much of the motivation for this literature has come
from the observation, following Mehra and Prescott (1985), that the standard Lu-
cas (1978) asset pricing model has a great deal of trouble explaining the observed
high rates of return on equities (the “equity premium puzzle”) and the low rates
of return on riskless securities (the “riskless rate puzzle”). Most of this literature,
of which Telmer (1993), Lucas (1994), and Heaton and Lucas (1996) are repre-
sentative, provides numerical solutions to models calibrated to observed param-
eters. (Kocherlakota (1996) provides an excellent and intuitive discussion of the
numerical ﬁndings.) This literature generally concludes that market incomplete-
ness alone is not sufﬁcient to explain the quantitative features of the data. Heaton
and Lucas (1996), in particular, argue that explaining the data requires substan-
tial trading frictions, persistence of idiosyncratic shocks, or correlation between
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks — in addition to market incompleteness. Be-
cause we focus on exchange economies, on welfare, and on the asymptotic limit
as the discount factor tends to 1, our work is not precisely comparable to the
macroeconomics/ﬁnance literature, but it is probably fair to say that our results
point in a different direction. In particular, we ﬁnd that, in the presence of ag-
gregate risk, market incompleteness alone may have substantial effects. We stress
that we provide theorems, not numerical solutions; on the other hand, we do not
provide quantitative results.
Calvet (1997) and Willen (1999) have examined some similar questions in a
particular incomplete markets framework (one good, exponential utility, normally
distributed asset returns, negative consumption allowed). Calvet shows that in-
completeness matters a great deal — in particular, volatility of asset prices may
be extremely high — if consumers are quite impatient. Willen, on the other hand,
shows that incompleteness matters very little if consumers are reasonably patient.
OurresultsprovideatheoreticalechototheempiricalconclusionsofTownsend
(1992) concerning village economies: a great deal of risk sharing may take place
even in the absence of a complicated structure of ﬁnancial instruments.
3The questions we raise here are reminiscent of what Friedman (1957) called
the permanent income hypothesis: that traders behave so as to maintain a constant
marginal utility of income. Friedman’s discussion of the permanent income hy-
pothesis was informal; he did not offer any speciﬁc formalization. Yaari (1976)
established the validity in his setting of a one-consumer formalization: “...as the
number of planning periods becomes very large, optimal consumption tends to
permanent income ...” Since Yaari’s results and our Theorem A lead to the same
conclusions about utility, we here establish the validity, in the setting of Theorem
A, of an equilibrium formalization: as consumer discount factors tend to 1, the
utility of equilibriumconsumption tends to the utility of permanent income. In the
setting of Theorem B, however, the utility of equilibrium consumption does not
tendtotheutility ofpermanentincome, butrathertothe utilityof permanentshare.
In our variousexamples for which market incompletenessmatters, consumption is
not perfectly smoothed, and again the utility of equilibrium consumption does not
tend to the utility of permanent income. Bewley (1977) provides a rather different
formalization of the permanent income hypothesis. Bewley’s framework is dif-
ferent from Yaari’s in that Bewley treats an equilibrium formulation rather than a
one-consumer formulation, and different from ours in that Bewley’s model econ-
omy is populated by a continuum of traders who are ex ante identical but subject
to idiosyncratic shocks, while our model economies are populated by heteroge-
neous traders. It is probably fair to say that our work suggests that the permanent
income hypothesis, in the traditional sense, is not likely to hold, except in a world
that can be approximated by a one-good world with no aggregate risk
Despite a superﬁcial similarity, our work is quite different from the body of
work in the ﬁnance literature showing that, when information is revealed gradu-
ally, frequent trading of long-lived assets may lead to dynamically complete ﬁ-
nancial markets and hence to efﬁciency. (See Kreps (1981) and Dufﬁe and Huang
(1987) for instance.) In our framework, information is not revealed gradually,
only short-lived assets are traded, trading is not frequent, and markets are not
dynamically complete.
42 The Economy
2.1 Time and Uncertainty
Time and uncertainty are represented by a countably inﬁnite tree S. Each node
on the tree represents a date-event. The initial date-event (the root of the tree) is
denoted by 0
￿ S. For date-events s
￿ s
￿
￿ S, we write s
￿ s
￿
to mean that s
￿
follows
s (and s precedes s
￿
). For each date-event s
￿ S other than 0, we write s
￿ for
the (unique) date-event that immediately precedes s, s
￿ for the set of date-events









￿ for the set of date-events that follow date-
events that immediately follow s, and so forth.
Each s
￿ S is a ﬁnite history of exogenous events; we denote the length of that
history by t
￿ s
￿ . Thus t
￿ 0
￿








￿ 1. A complete path through the
tree S is a complete history of exogenous events; write
￿ for the set of all such









￿ ) and a date t, write st (respectively, ht) for the history up to and
including time t. Thus st
￿ S and t
￿ st
￿
￿ t (respectively, ht




We assume that exogenous events follow a ﬁnite Markov chain with state
space W and strictly positive transition probabilities.6 That is, there is a map
s
￿
￿ ws : S
￿ W which is a bijection on the set s
￿ of immediate successors of
every node s
￿ S. For s









￿ is the conditional
probability that date-event s occurs, given that s has occured. Because the under-




￿ are strictly positive and uniformly bounded away






￿ 1. For s
￿ S, write ps for the unconditional
probability that the date-event s is reached. Because some date-event is reached









￿ 1 commodities available for consumption at each date-event. The
commodity space is the space
￿ ¥
￿ S







￿ L, we write xs
￿ RL for the bundle speciﬁed at date event s. A con-
6It would sufﬁce that the underlying Markov chain be recurrent. We assume strictly positive
transition probabilities for convenience.









Commodities are traded only on spot markets (there are no markets for contingent




Given a spot price p, we write ps
￿ RL for the spot prices at date-event s. It is
convenient to take the ﬁrst good as numeraire, and to normalize so that the spot
price of the numeraire good is 1 at each date-event s
￿ S.
2.3 Securities
Intertemporal trade takes place through the exchange of securities (assets). For
simplicity, we assume that J securities are available at each date-event, that secu-
rity returns are denominated in units of the numeraire commodity, and that each
security is short-lived, yielding returns only at the immediate successor nodes.
Security Aj traded at the date-event s yields Aj
￿ s
￿ units of the numeraire good at
the date-event s
￿ s
￿ ; the portfolio q




￿ units of the numeraire commodity at the date-event
s
￿ s
￿ . (Note that divs : RJ
￿ R is a linear operator.) We assume that for each s
there is a portfolio y such that divsy
￿ 0 for each s
￿ s
￿ ; this will certainly be the
case if a riskless bond is traded at each date-event. Security prices are functions
q : S
￿ RJ; we write qs
￿ RJ for security prices at date-event s.
2.4 Utilities















￿ R. We assume traders maximize the discounted sum of expected utility,
























We assume that ui is a smooth (C2) strictly concave, strictly increasing function.7
We writeUi
d in order to emphasize the dependence on the discount factor d, which
we think of as a parameter. The leading factor
￿ 1
￿ d
￿ normalizes so that the
discounted utility of the constant consumption stream c is ui
￿ c
￿ , independent of
the discount factor d.
7Note that utility functions are bounded below.
62.5 Endowments
We assume endowments are Markov (i.e., the endowment ei
s of trader i at date-
event s depends only on the state ws of the underlying Markov chain at s) and
bounded away from 0 (i.e., there is a constant m
















2.6 Budget Sets and Debt Constraints




and a portfolio trading plan qi : S
￿ RJ. At each date-event s, trader













That is, expenditure to purchase consumption and to purchase securities does not
exceed income from sale of endowment and from dividends on securities acquired
at the previous date-event. (Recall that securities are denominated in units of the
numeraire commodity, whose price is normalized to 1.)
In our inﬁnite horizon setting, these spot constraints are not sufﬁcient to rule
out Ponzi schemes (doubling strategies) and hence unlimited amounts of borrow-
ing. As we show in Levine and Zame (1996), the additional constraints necessary
to rule out Ponzi schemes may be formalized in any of a number of ways, each of
which leads to an equivalent notion of equilibrium.8 Here we ﬁnd it convenient
to formalize the constraints by requiring that it should be possible to repay almost
all the debt in ﬁnite time.
To formalize this idea, ﬁx prices p
￿ q and a portfolio trading plan q. Deﬁne
debt at date-event s as the value (in units of account) of the obligation to repay on
securities held entering date-event s. Because securities are denominated in units
of the numeraire commodity, and the price of the numeraire commodity is 1, debt





If this quantity is positive, a trader following the portfolio trading plan q is in debt
entering date-event s. To meet this debt, the trader must raise income from the
sale of endowment and/or securities (selling securities is borrowing).
8See also Magill and Quinzii (1994).
7We constrain debt at date-event s by prescribing a positive upper bound on ds.9
(Prescribing a negative upper bound would require traders to save.) We say that
the debt ds
￿ 0 can be repaid in ﬁnite time from s if there are consumption and
portfolio plans y










￿ js satisfy the spot budget constraint (1) at every date-event s
￿ s
’ if s








￿ T then ds
￿ 0
That is, the plans meet the liability ds at the date-event s, meet the spot budget
constraints at every date-event following the date-event s and leave no debt at any





* d : d can be repaid in ﬁnite time from s
+
































Note that we constrain trades at date event s by limiting debt at all date events
that immediately follow s. (No debt constraint is necessary entering the initial
date-event 0 because initial holdings of securities are 0.)
2.7 Equilibrium















9The reader familiar with Levine and Zame (1996) will note that we use here the opposite sign
convention for debt and debt constraints.





























That is, commodity markets clear, security markets clear, traders optimize in
their budget sets. Levine and Zame (1996) show that (with assumptions weaker
than those made here) an equilibrium exists.10
1 11
10Existence of equilibrium depends on the assumption that assets are denominated in a nu-
meraire good; without that assumption, only pseudo-equilibria need exist.
11As Kubler and Schmedders (1999) show, Markov equilibria need not exist.
93 Idiosyncratic Risk
In this section and the next we address one good economies. We begin by consid-
ering economies in which risk is purely idiosyncratic.
Assumption A1 L
￿ 1 (one good).
Assumption A2 The social endowment e
￿ åiei
s is independent of s
￿ S (no
aggregate risk).
Because the social endowment is constant and the number of traders is ﬁnite,
endowments must necessarily be correlated across individuals. However, this nec-
essary correlation is purely an artifact of the ﬁniteness of our model. An obvious
alternative would be to consider a model with a continuum of traders, in which
case independence of individual risks would be consistent with absence of aggre-
gate risk. A result similar to our Theorem A below could be established about
such a model. We prefer here the model with a ﬁnite number of traders because
Levine and Zame (1996) guarantees that an equilibrium exists; to our knowledge,
no comparable existence theorems are known for the model with a continuum of
traders.12
In addition to the previous assumptions about utility functions, we assume the
following.
Assumption A3 For each i, Dui is (weakly) convex.
If utility functions are C3, Assumption A3 will be satisﬁed if third derivatives
are non-negative (so Assumption A3 is related to a precautionary demand for
saving in the sense of Leland (1968)), which will in turn be the case if absolute
risk aversion is non-increasing. See Lemma 1 below for the import of Assumption
A3 in our context.
Finally, we make one assumption about the asset structure.
12Modelswithacontinuumofidentical traders wereintroducedandanalyzedbyBewley(1986),
but we allow here for heterogeneity across traders.
10Assumption A4 At each date-event s, a riskless real bond, yielding one unit of
consumption at each date-event s
￿ s
￿ , is available for trade.
Note that we allow for the possibility that other assets are also traded, and that
different assets are traded at different date-events.
We are interested in the nature of equilibrium for discount factors d close to 1.
We therefore ﬁx securities, endowments and period utility functions ui. For each
discount factor d
2 1, write
3 d for the economy (with the given securities, en-
dowments and period utility functions) in which traders use the common discount
factor d, and write EQd for the set of equilibria of
3 d. Because we normalize the
spot price of consumption to be identically 1, we henceforth suppress spot prices.
An equilibrium z

















￿ and portfolio plans
￿ qi
z
￿ . Given an equilibrium z and
a date event s






￿ s and so forth) for prices,
consumption and portfolio choice of the i-th consumer at s. When there is no
danger of confusion, we suppress the subscript z.
Because individual endowments depend only on the state of the underlying
Markov chain, they each have a long run average; write ¯ ei for the long run average
of ei.
Assumptions A1 and A2, together with our previous assumptions, imply that,
for every d, the Pareto optimal allocations of
3 d coincide with (N-tuples of) ﬁxed
shares of the constant social endowment. In particular, for every d, the perfect













￿ at which each trader consumes his long
run average endowment, is Pareto optimal.
Our ﬁrst result asserts that when d is sufﬁciently close to 1 (that is, when
traders are sufﬁciently patient), every equilibrium is close to perfect risk sharing,
in the sense that (i) equilibrium utilities are close to the utilities of the perfect risk
sharing allocation, (ii) the time-discounted probability that equilibrium consump-
tions deviate from the perfect risk sharing allocation by more than a given amount
is small, (iii) the time-discounted probability that equilibrium asset prices deviate
from risk neutral pricing by more than a given amount is small.13
13Because feasible consumptions are bounded by the social endowment, (ii) implies that the
time discounted expected deviation of consumptions from perfect risk sharing is small. However,
equilibrium asset prices need not be bounded, so (iii) does not imply that the time discounted
expected deviation of asset prices from risk neutral pricing is small.































This is the set of date events at which the equilibrium consumption of some trader
differs from his long run average consumption by more than e.














6 . If s is any date event and j is a portfolio
traded at s, then Es
￿ divsj
￿ is the expected payoff of j, and dEs
￿ divsj
￿ is the
discounted expected payoff of j, which by deﬁnition is the risk neutral price. The
deviation from risk neutral pricing can therefore be measured by the amount by





























This is the set of date events at which risk neutral pricing of some portfolio fails
by more than e.
Theorem A If Assumptions A1-A4 are satisﬁed then:































































12The proof (deferred to Appendix 1) provides a lower bound on equilibrium
utility by constructing a budget feasible plan whose utility is almost that of con-
stant average consumption. From this estimate, the nature of the Pareto set allows
us to infer (i), and the remaining conclusions follow easily. A crucial step in the
argument is establishing that the price of the riskless bond is not much below 1
at every date-event. (Equivalently: the riskless interest rate is not much above 0.)
This will be important because the budget feasible plan we construct is ﬁnanced
by borrowing, and a high price (low interest rate) makes borrowing easy.
The price (interest rate) estimate we need is contained in the following lemma,
which represents a particular formalization of an intuition common in the ﬁnance
literature (but not, as far as we can ﬁnd, established rigorously in any context
similar to ours) that a precautionary demand for saving drives down the interest
rate. The elegant proof below is a small adaptation of an argument in Hara and
Kajii (2000); our original argument was much more cumbersome.







an equilibrium for the economy
3 d and q1 is the price of the riskless bond, then
q1
s
￿ d at every date-event s
￿ S. (That is, the price of the riskless bond is bounded
below by the subjective discount factor d at every date-event; equivalently, the
riskless interest rate is no greater than the subjective discount rate 1
d
￿ 1 at every
date-event.)
Proof Fix a date-event s
￿ S, and write q1
s for the price of the riskless bond at
s. For each trader i, an application of the ﬁrst order conditions for equilibrium




























































































































which is the desired result.
144 Aggregate Risk
As we shall see in Appendix 1, the proof of Theorem A depends on the estimate
established in Lemma 1, that the equilibrium riskless interest rate is bounded
above by the subjective discount rate, and so is small when traders are patient.
When there is aggregate risk, however, this bound need not obtain; when the ag-
gregate endowment is low, many traders will want to borrow, and this demand for
loans may drive up the riskless interest rate. A high riskless interest rate inter-
feres with risk sharing because it makes borrowing difﬁcult. The two examples
below formalize this intuition, showing that aggregate risk can interfere with the
sharing of individual risk, even under rather stringent assumptions on preferences,
endowments and the asset structure. In Theorem B, which follows the examples,
we show that tradability of aggregate risk is key to almost perfect risk sharing.
Our ﬁrst two assumptions parallel those of the previous section.
Assumption B1 L
￿ 1 (one good).




F es is independent
of the aggregate endowment process es.14
We assume that period utility functions are identical across agents and display
constant relative risk aversion.15


















We assume as before that a riskless bond is traded at each date-event.
14See the comments in Section 3 about correlation across traders.
15When g
L 1, preferences over inﬁnite horizon consumption streams generated by CRRA pe-
riod utility functions do not satisfy our standing assumptions from Section 2; hence we are not
guaranteed that an equilibrium exists in this case.
15Assumption B4 At each date-event s, a riskless real bond B yielding one unit of
consumption at each date-event s
￿ s
￿ , is available for trade.
As in Section 3, we are interested in the nature of equilibrium for discount
factors d close to 1. As before, we ﬁx securities, endowments and period util-
ity functions ui. As before, normalize so that the spot price of consumption is
identically 1. For each discount factor d
2 1, write
3 d for the economy with the
given securities, endowments and period utility functions, in which traders use the
common discount factor d, and write EQd for the set of equilibria of
3 d. Because
endowmentsare Markov,bothendowmentsandindividual endowment sharespos-
sess long run averages; write ¯ ei for the long run average of ei and ¯ fi for the long
run average of fi.
Assumptions B1-B3, together with our previous assumptions, imply that, for
every d, the set of Pareto optimal allocations of
3 d coincides with the set of ﬁxed














￿ at which each trader consumes his long run average
share of the varying social endowment, is Pareto optimal (for each d).
However, even these very strong assumptions are not enough to guarantee that
market incompleteness does not matter.
Example 1 We describe an economy satisfying the assumptions B1-B4 above,
and in which only the riskless bond is traded, and show that almost perfect risk-
sharing does not obtain.
The underlying Markov process has 4 states: the process is i.i.d. with tran-
sition probabilities 1/4; the initial state is state 1. There is a single consumption












2 1. In states 1, 3 the social endowment
is L (low), in states 2, 4 the social endowment is H (high); H
￿ L
￿ 1. Trader 1
(henceforward referred to as the large trader) has endowment share 1
￿ e in states
1, 2 and 1
￿ ke in states 3, 4; trader 2 (henceforward referred to as the small trader)
has endowment share e in states 1, 2 and ke in states 3,4. We take k
￿ 3; e
￿ 0 is a
small parameter, to be chosen below. Note that individual endowment shares are
independent of the social endowment, as assumed in B2.
As before, we are interested in the behavior of equilibrium for discount factors
d close to 1. We assert that for d close to 1, no equilibrium is close to perfect risk
16sharing.
The intuition is simple. Imagine ﬁrst that e
￿ 0, so that this is a one trader
economy. In that case, bond prices are determined by the large trader’s marginal
utilities at his endowment (which, because e
￿ 0, coincides with the aggregate

















































Now imagine that e
￿ 0 but inﬁnitesimal, so that the small trader has no effect
on prices. Then the bond price continues to satisfy (4) when the aggregate en-
dowment is L and d is sufﬁciently close to 1, whence the riskless interest rate
is positive and bounded away from 0 when the social endowment is L. Say the
riskless interest rate is at least r
￿ 0 when the social endowment is L. Because
the equilibrium conditions require that the small trader be able to almost repay
debt at every date-event, this entails that the debt of the small trader can never
be so large that his endowment will not cover the interest on his debt. Thus, the
debt of the small trader can never exceed keL
F r, independent of the subjective
discount factor d. On the other hand, consumption smoothing requires the small
trader to borrow when his endowment share is small, and in particular, whenever
the Markov process is in state 1. Hence, along any history in which the Markov
process enters state 1 and then remains in state 1 for a long time, the small trader
will be unable to perfectly smooth consumption (because doing so would eventu-
ally raise his debt above keL
F r). For d close to 1, the utility loss from the failure
to smooth perfectly along such histories will be non-negligible. Thus, an absolute
upper bound on the debt of the small trader implies an absolute upper bound on
the ability of the small trader to smooth consumption, and so rules out perfect risk
sharing.
Unfortunately, two complications make turning this intuition into rigorous
analysis rather difﬁcult. The ﬁrst complication is that if e is small but not in-
ﬁnitesimal, equilibrium bond prices may not satisfy (4) when the aggregate en-
dowment is L. Indeed, bond prices may fail this estimate by a great deal at a few
17date-events. If bond prices are occasionally very high (so that interest rates are oc-
casionally very negative), the small trader will be able to repay a very large debt.
The second complication is that whether or not equilibrium bond prices satisfy (4)
and (5), the interest rate will certainly be positive in some date-events. This leaves
open the possibility that the small trader can build a large buffer stock of saving.
Our formal analysis of Example 1 follows the intuition above to establish
bounds on the equilibrium debt and saving of the small trader that are independent
of the discount factor d. Such bounds imply a limit on equilibrium consumption
smoothing of the small trader and hence rule out almost perfect risk sharing. Be-
cause the argument is quite involved, we defer the details to Appendix 2.
N
In treating a framework in which there is aggregate risk, but only riskless
bonds are traded, Example 1 parallels Telmer (1993), but reaches the opposite
conclusion. Much of the macroeconomics/ﬁnance literature (see Lucas (1994)
and Heaton and Lucas (1996) for instance), however, treats a framework in both
bonds and equity are traded. It seems natural to view the social endowment as




At each date-event s, there are available for trade:




(b) a risklessbondB yieldingone unitof consumption at each date-events
￿ s
￿
In Example 1, there are only two aggregate states, so if riskless bonds and
the social endowment are both traded then the market for aggregate risk is com-
plete. As Theorem B below demonstrates, this is enough to guarantee that almost
perfect risk sharing again obtains. If there are at least 3 aggregate states, how-
ever, tradability of riskless bonds and the social endowment is compatible with
incompleteness of the market for aggregate risk. Example 2 below suggests that,
in such a setting, almost perfect risk sharing again need not obtain. Unfortunately,
a rigorous analysis — which would necessarily be much more complicated than
the rigorous analysis of Example 1 presented in Appendix 2 — is beyond our
18present capabilities, so we content ourselves with presenting the (very suggestive)
intuition.
Example 2 We describe an economy satisfying the assumptions B1-B3, B4
￿
above, and present the intuition that almost perfect risk-sharing should not ob-
tain.
The underlying Markov process has 6 states. The process is i.i.d.; for p
￿ 0









￿ 6 the probability of transiting into state j is p
2; the initial state is state 1.
If s is a date-event, write w
￿ s
￿ for the state of the Markov process at s. There is a
single consumption good. The social endowment is H in states 1, 3, M in states 2,






are two traders. Trader 1 (the large trader) has endowment share 1
￿ e in states 1,
2, 5 and 1
￿ 3e in states 3, 4, 6; trader 2 (the small trader) has endowment share e
in states 1, 2, 5 and 3e in states 3, 4, 6. The endowment patterns are summarized


























Traders share the same CRRA period utility function; to simplify computation
we take risk aversion g
￿ 1





Two assets are available at each date-event s: a risky asset A, yielding the so-
cial endowment in each date-event s
￿ s
￿ , and a riskless bond B yielding one unit
of consumption in each date-event s
￿ s
￿ . The probability p and share e are pa-
rameters, chosen below. Note that individual endowment shares are independent
of the social endowment, as assumed in B2.
As before, we are interested in the behavior of equilibrium for discount factors
d close to 1; we suggest that if p
￿ e are small then no equilibrium is close to perfect
risk sharing (independent of d).
19To understand the intuition, suppose as in Example 1 that e were positive but
inﬁnitesimal, so that asset prices are determined by the large trader’s marginal
utilities at his endowment (which coincides, up to an inﬁnitesimal, with the ag-






































































































































Fix a date-event s for which w
￿ s
￿
￿ 5, so aggregate endowment is L
￿ 1 and
the share of the small trader is e. We assert that, independently of the discount
factor d, it is not possible for the small trader to repay a debt ds
￿ 1 in ﬁnite
time (and hence not possible for the small trader to repay any larger debt in ﬁnite
time). As in Example 1, this will rule out perfect risk sharing, because the small
trader must borrow when his endowment share is small, and in particular when the
Markov process is in state 1. Thus, along histories in which the Markov process
enters state 1 and then remains in state 1 for a long time, the small trader cannot
perfectly smooth consumption (because doing so would eventually raise his debt
above 1). For d close to 1, the utility loss from failure to smooth perfectly along
such histories will be non-negligible. Thus, as in Example 1, an absolute upper
bound on the debt of the small trader implies an absolute upper bound on his
ability to smooth consumption, and so rules out perfect risk sharing. (Keep in
mind that this assumes the pricing relationships above and represents an intuition,
not a rigorous argument.)
To see that it is not possible for the small trader to repay a debt ds
￿ 1 in ﬁnite
time, independently of d, suppose there is a plan which repays the debt ds
￿ 1 in
20ﬁnite time. Among all such plans, we consider one which repays fastest; say that
repaymentis complete(and debtis 0)by datet
￿ s
￿
% T (thatis, T datesafter s). The















then debt at s
￿
cannot be less than 1 — else we could shift the plan from s
￿
to begin
at s and repay the debt in fewer than T dates.







￿ 2 or 5. In particular, let t1
5
￿ s












￿ 2. For each t











￿ 2. Write an
￿ bn for the required purchases
of the assets A
￿ B at the date-event n.











￿ 5, the crucial property of our plan guarantees that debt is no









￿ 2, so acquiring the portfolio asA




% bs at t1
2.
Now consider the situation at the date-event t1
2. Budget balance at t1
2 requires
that the debt dt1
2
￿ 4as























￿ 5, the crucial









































Now we estimate these various debts. The debt dt1















































And by induction, for each t
￿ T
￿ 1, the debt dtt
￿ 1












































The solutions to the linear programs (6)-(8) are continuous functions of the pa-
rameters p
￿ e
￿ d. Since 2046
625
￿ 46
25, it follows that for p
￿ e sufﬁciently small and d




























































￿ , it follows in particular that dtT
2
￿ 0. But this contradicts
our assumption that the plan repays debt in T dates from s. We conclude that a
debt ds
￿ 1 or greater cannot be repaid in ﬁnite time from date-event s.
22As in Example 1, this suggests that formal analysis will show that almost
perfect risk sharing cannot be achieved.
N
As these examples suggest, when there is aggregate risk, almost perfect risk
sharing requires that the “right” securities (or portfolios) be traded. Which secu-
rities are the “right” ones will depend on utility functions, but we can guarantee
that the “right” securities are traded if we require that all derivatives on the social
endowment are traded, so that the market for aggregate risk is complete.
Write ¡ for the set of possible values of the social endowment e. Because
endowments are Markov, ¡ is a ﬁnite set.16 The following assumption is that all
derivatives on the social endowment are traded at every date event.17 As Ross
(1976) shows, this is implied by the assumption that options on the social endow-





For each date-event s and for each u
￿ ¡, there is a portfolio Gu
s











Theorem B, paralleling Theorem A of the previous section, asserts that when
traders are sufﬁciently patient every equilibrium is close to perfect risk sharing, in
the sense that (i) equilibrium utilities are close to the utilities of the perfect risk
sharing allocation, (ii) the time-discounted probability that equilibrium consump-
tions deviate from the perfect risk sharing allocation by more than a given amount
is small, (iii) the time-discounted probability that equilibrium asset prices deviate
from marginal rates of substitution at the perfect risk sharing allocation by more
than a given amount is small. (In the absence of aggregate risk, this reduces to
risk neutral pricing, as in Theorem A.) As before, ﬁx a discount factor d and an
16If ¡ and s
V have the same cardinality, availability of all derivatives on the social endowment
is equivalent to completeness of intertemporal markets. In the typical case, however, ¡ is much
smaller than s
V .












6 . As before, for each e





























































The ﬁrst set is the set of date events at which some consumer’s equilibrium con-
sumption differs from his perfect risk sharing consumption by more than e; the
second set is the set of date events at which risk neutral pricing of some portfolio
fails by more than e.



































































As with Theorem A, the proof rests on a price estimate. Recall that ¡ is the
range of the social endowment process. For s
￿ S
￿ u




set of date-events s
￿ s
￿ at which es
￿ u, and write p
￿ u
￿s
￿ for the conditional





guarantees that a portfolio Gu





￿ and 0 otherwise is traded; the following result (which relies on
24the assumption of CRRA utilities) provides a bound on its equilibrium price. The
proof parallels closely the proof of Lemma 1.


























at every date-event s
￿ S.






￿ 2, which is strictly positive. In particular, Du is convex, so
we can follow the same plan as in the proof of Lemma 1. Fix a date-event s
￿ S
and a consumption level u
￿ ¡. For each trader i, an application of the ﬁrst order































































































































































































































































































































26which is the desired result.
We have assumed here that individual shares are independent of the social
endowment. The polar opposite assumption would be that individual shares are
perfectly correlated with the social endowment. In that case, there would be no
idiosyncratic risk, and derivatives on the social endowment would provide per-
fect risk sharing at every date-event. In particular, the conclusions of Theorem B
would obtain in this case too. We conjecture that the conclusions of Theorem B
obtain in the intermediate cases also, without any assumption of independence or
correlation.
275 Two Goods
We present here a simple example to demonstrate that when there are two con-
sumption goods, market incompleteness may matter a great deal even if there is
no aggregate risk — indeed, even if there is no (fundamental) risk at all.
Example 3 Fix any static 2 trader/2 commodity economy with the following
properties:
’ utility functions u1
￿ u2 are smooth and strictly concave
’ endowments w1

































































































The underlying Markov chain has two states
* U
￿ D
+ ; transition probabilities
are identically 1/2 (so the process is i.i.d.). The information tree S for the dynamic
economy therefore has 2 branches at every node. If s













￿ D (i.e., the underlying Markov















+ is the set of nodes that follow the initial node 0. Write
g for the set of
nodes that follow 0U and
h for the set of nodes that follow 0D.
There are two consumption goods. For i
￿ 1
￿ 2, endowments are wi
s
￿ wi and,





























28That is, we simply replicate the static economy at each date-event; there is no
fundamental uncertainty — but the underlying Markov chain provides a source of
sunspots.
Fix a discount factor d
2 1. The dynamic economy has many equilibria, in-
cluding sunspot equilibria in which the underlying Markov chain serves as a co-
ordination device. One such equilibrum may be described as follows:





￿ , the bond price is equal to the subjective discount factor d, the
bond is not traded;
’ at date-events s
￿
i






the bond price is equal to the subjective discount factor d, the bond is not
traded;
’ at date-events s
￿
j






the bond price is equal to the subjective discount factor d, the bond is not
traded.
We leave tothe reader the simple task of usingthe propertiesof the staticeconomy
to verify that this is an equilibrium of the inﬁnite horizon economy.
For this equilibrium, consumptions in every date-event are Pareto optimal in
the static economy, but consumptions at date-events in
g differ from consump-
tions at date-events in
h , Because utility functions are strictly concave, equilib-
rium consumptions are certainly not Pareto optimal. Because equilibrium con-
sumptions are independent of d, equilibrium utilities certainly do not approach
Pareto optimal utilities as d
￿ 1.
296 Conclusion
We have argued here that, in a one-good economy populated by inﬁnitely-lived,
patient traders, market incompleteness will not matter if shocks are transient and
risk is purely idiosyncratic. However, market incompleteness will matter if there
is aggregate risk and the “wrong” assets are traded, or if there is more than one
good. Aggregate risk matters because it affects asset prices. Multiple consump-
tion goods matter because commodity prices provide another source of untraded
risk. As Example 3 demonstrates clearly, the absence of some ﬁnancial markets
weakens the connection between spot prices at various date-events, and there-
fore expands the role of expectations — even though expectations are correct in
equilibrium. The work of Farmer (1997) on multiple equilibria gives a different
perspective.
Perhaps the most important implication of our work is that the effects of mar-
ket structure may be much different in a dynamic setting than in a static (or short
horizon) setting. In particular, the incentives for ﬁnancial innovation may be quite
different when dynamic behavior is taken into account.
Two limitations of our work are worth noting. The ﬁrst is that we treat only
exchange economies with perishable goods; interesting extensions would incor-
porate production, durable goods, human capital and growth. The second is that
we do not provide numerical estimates or rates of convergence. In particular, we
do not estimate the utility consequences of market incompleteness for given sub-
jective discount factors. Our methods could certainly be adapted to provide such
estimates, but the estimates obtained would not be very good. We suspect that
sharper methods — and perhaps more stringent assumptions — will be necessary
toprovidetrulyusefulestimates. Forsomeestimatesinourframework, seeKubler
and Schmedders (2000); for some estimates in a rather different framework, see
Willen (1998).
30Appendix 1: Proofs
An overview of the proofs may help guide the reader. To prove Theorem A, we
ﬁx a discount factor and an equilibrium. For each trader, we construct an alterna-
tive plan of consumption and portfolio trades. Before a speciﬁed stopping time,
deﬁned in terms of a debt limit, this alternative plan calls for consuming slightly
lessthan the perfect risksharing quantity, borrowingwhen necessary and repaying
the debt when possible; after the stopping time, it calls for consumption slighly
less than the endowment and repaying the debt. A probabilistic estimate (Lemma
4) shows that, if the discount factor is sufﬁciently close to 1, it is very likely
that the stopping time is not reached for many periods. If follows, therefore, that
the alternative plan yields almost the utility of the perfect risk sharing allocation.
Because equilibrium plans are optimal, the equilibrium plan must yield at least
this much utility. Because this conclusion obtains for every trader, the nature of
the Pareto set (implied by strict concavity of utility functions) guarantees that no
trader can obtain utility much greater than perfect risk sharing. Combining these
two inequalities yields (i). The ﬁrst order conditions then yield (ii), (iii).
Because the alternative plan described above is ﬁnanced by trading the risk-
less bond, this argument requires an estimate for the price of the riskless bond.
Lemma 1 provides the estimate we need: at every date-event, the price of the risk-
less bond is not much below 1 (equivalently, the riskless interest rate is not below
0). This one-sided estimate is good enough, because the alternative plan requires
borrowing but not saving; a high price (low interest rate), makes borrowing easy.
As Example 1 demonstrates, this lower bound for the price depends on the ab-
sence of aggregate risk. When there is aggregate risk, the interest rate depends on
the realization of the social endowment: when the social endowment is low many
traders want to borrow and the demand for loans drives up the interest rate. A high
interest rate makes it difﬁcult to borrow, and hence to ﬁnance a consumption plan
that is close to the perfect risk sharing consumption plan. However, with the as-
sumptions of Theorem B, such a consumption plan can be ﬁnanced by trading in a
particular derivative of the social endowment, carefully chosen to match marginal
utilities and prices; the price estimate for this derivative follows from Lemma 2.
Because the proofs of Theorems A and B are so similar, we have arranged the
following discussion to avoid redundancy. Our ﬁrst task is to establish a proba-
bilistic estimate; for this we need a version of thecentral limit theorem for func-
tions of a ﬁnite Markov chain. Lemma 3 below, which is Theorem (3), p.83 in
31Freedman (1983), is just what we need.18
1 19 Following common mathematical
usage, we write
kx
l for the greatest integer not exceeding x.
Lemma 3 Consider a recurrent Markov chain with ﬁnite space W. Let F : W
￿
R be a real-valued function on W whose long-run average is 0. Let W¥ be the
space of all inﬁnite sequences of elements of W. Fix a state x
￿ W and let p be
its stationary probability. For each s








(respectively) the t-th and t
% 1-st occurrences of the state x in the sequence s;































































The following lemma provides the probabilistic estimate we require.
Lemma 4 Fix a discount factor d
2 1, real numbersC
￿ g
￿ 0, and a trader i. Let
































































18Freedman, following an idea of Chung (1960), allows for a Markov chain with a countably
inﬁnite state space. In that more general context, he imposes expectation and variance conditions
that are automatically satisﬁed when the state space is ﬁnite.






































































￿ W, let s




￿ zs. Because the endowment process is Markov and the long-run average









































￿ 1, the rate of convergence in the usual strong law of large numbers (or
































￿ 0 in probability
as d
￿ 1. The desired result (ii) now follows from the triangle inequality.
We are now ready to begin the proof of Theorems A and B. In order to give
a uniﬁed argument, we abstract the common elements of the two settings. We
take as given a parameter g and a family
* Ds : s
￿ S
+ of portfolios satisfying two
properties:
(i) for every s











33(ii) for every equilibrium of





To obtainTheorem A from the argumentgiven, take g
￿ 1 and for each s take Ds to
consist of one unit of the riskless bond. To obtain Theorem B from the argument
given, take g
￿ 1













In either case, property (i) follows immediately and property (ii) follows from
Lemma 1 or 2, as appropriate.
Proof of Theorems A and B Fix an equilibrium. We provide lower bounds
on equilibrium utilities by constructing alternative plans which are feasible and












Fix a trader i and a real number h
￿ 0. Choose ¯ e




































In what follows, we are interested in the limit as d











The alternative plan y
￿ j calls for consumption of a target quantity until a cer-
tain stopping time, which occurs when a given debt limit has been reached:
34the target consumption at s


















￿ js in the following way:
’ If ds
2 d
M for every s
￿ s and ei
s
F es














That is, if debt has always been below the debt limit and the endowment
share is less than the long run average, consume the target consumption,
borrowing to do so.
’ If ds
2 d
M for every s
￿ s and ei
s
F es















That is, if debt has always been below the debt limit and the endowment
share is equal to or greater than the long run average, consume the target
























That is, if debt has ever reached the debt limit, consume slightly less than
the endowment, using the difference to pay off some of the debt, and roll
over the remaining debt — but do not save.20
20Of course it is not optimal for trader i not to save when possible — but yi
x ji is not intended to
be an optimal plan, only an alternative we use to provide a lower bound on equilibrium utility. We
can estimate accumulation of debt because we have a lower bound on asset prices, but we cannot
estimate accumulation of saving because we do not have an upper bound on asset prices. We ﬁnd
it simpler, therefore, to avoid saving entirely.
35We will show below that y
￿ j is a feasible plan and that it yields consumption cs
at “most” date events. If ¯ e is small, then cs is only slightly less than ¯ fies, and
ui
￿ cs
￿ is only slightly less than ui
￿ ¯ fies
￿ , so y
￿ j yields utility almost as large as the
perfect risk sharing consumption.





￿ . Suppose trader i holds debt ds entering s, consumes c,




2 0then all debtis repaid and




￿ 0 then the spot budget













of the portfolio Ds. Thus debt at t
￿ s
















































Applying the evolution equation (13) and recalling that qs
$ Ds
￿ d we ﬁnd





























































With these calculations in hand, we show that y
￿ j is a feasible plan. Our
construction guarantees that y
￿ j satisﬁes the spot budget constraints. To show that
satisﬁes the debt constraints, ﬁx a date-event s. If ds
z
2 d

























s at every s







































s . The plan y




and continue forever, so
calculation 2) above shows that the speciﬁed plan ds repays the debt ds in ﬁnite
time. We conclude that y




￿ g. As in Lemma 4, let T
M
￿ d









￿ be the set of histories for which the stopping time














on good histories (those belonging to
￿ 1) and then conditional on bad histories
(those not belonging to













￿ and at least m
￿
¯ eM1




￿ . The utility Ui
d
￿ good
￿ conditional on such a good history













































































































































￿ 1, consumption is at least m
￿ ¯ eM1




























Combining these two estimates (and keeping in mind that utility could be neg-





















































































































￿ . For every date-event
s, our assumptions guarantee that qs
$ Ds
￿ d and that if the plan y
￿ j is followed
then debt is never greater than 2d
M . Just as in calculation 2) above, this implies





































































































































￿ 1, as asserted.





















































In view of the estimate (11), we obtain a lower bound on the utility of the con-




























































































This is the desired lower bound on equilibrium utilities.




























For each l with 0
2 l

















￿ ¯ fkes if xk
￿ ¯ fkes
There is a unique l







% h. Set Xk
￿ zl
w , For each
j
K



























% h. Our construction and the lower bound




































￿ Pareto dominatesthe allocation
￿ ¯ fie
￿ . As we have noted
previously, the allocation
￿ ¯ fie














for each trader k. This is the desired upper bound on utilities.
Combining our lower and upper bounds, we conclude that, if d is sufﬁciently


















for each i. Since h
￿ 0 is arbitary, this yields (i).
To prove(ii), ﬁx e
￿ 0. Pareto optimality of
￿ ¯ fie
￿ impliesthere are strictlypos-
itive welfare weights
￿ li
￿ , summing to 1, for which
￿ ¯ fie
￿ maximizes the weighted
40sum åliUi
￿ yi
￿ of utilities. Our assumptions guarantee that
￿ ¯ fies
￿ is Pareto opti-




the same weights. Strict concavity of period utility functions implies that
￿ ¯ fies
￿
is the unique allocation maximizing this weighted sum. It follows from conti-
nuity of the weighted sum and ﬁniteness of the range of the social endowment
map that there is an ¯ e
￿ 0 with the property that if
￿ xi
s







￿ e for some i























































In view of (i), the ﬁrst expression of (16) tends to 0 as d tends to 1; hence the last
expression also tends to 0 as d tends to 1. Because ¯ e depends only on e and is
independent of d. this implies (ii).
To prove (iii), ﬁx e
￿ 0. Because the range of the endowment mapping is
ﬁnite, we can choose e
M
￿ 0 sufﬁciently small that for every trader i and every
date-event s
￿ S, if consumptions at s and at all date-events s
￿ s
￿ are within e
M
of perfect risk sharing, then marginal utilities are within e of the marginal utilities







































Now ﬁx an equilibrium z









































































































￿ d and applying (ii) yields (iii).
As we have commented earlier, our result is driven by the ability of individu-
als to borrow and not by their ability to save. The distinction is important because
there is an asymmetry in our ability to estimate the prices of riskless or risky as-
sets. In order to borrow, individuals must sell bonds, so individuals who smooth
consumption by borrowing desire high asset prices (low interest rates); Lemmas
1 and 2 provide the bounds we need. In order to save, however, individuals must
buy bonds, so individuals who smooth consumption by saving desire low asset
prices (high interest rates). Unfortunately, we do not know how to obtain a priori
upper bounds on asset prices (lower bounds on interest rates). Indeed, even when
there is no aggregate risk, it seems possible that equilibriuminterest rates could be
arbitrarily negative at some date-events. (Our assumptions on preferences and en-
dowments guarantee that equilibrium interest rates must equal subjective interest
rates when markets are complete, but do not rule out negative interest rates when
— as here — markets are incomplete.)
We have assumed here that traders are equally patient (that is, share a common
discount factor); it is not entirely clear what conclusions would obtain if traders
are unequally patient. The problem is that the lower bound for the equilibrium
utility of the most patient trader depends on the estimated stopping time of the
42alternative plan, this estimated stopping time depends on the lower bound for
equilibrium prices, and this lower bound depends in turn on the discount factor of
the least patient trader. If the most patient trader is much more patient than the
least patient trader, utility accumulated before this stopping time might represent
an insigniﬁcant portion of the lifetime utility of the most patient trader. Thus
the argument given does not generalize unless discount factors are sufﬁciently
similar. On the other hand, it seems natural to suppose that, at equilibrium, the
least patient traders consume more in early date-events and less (or nothing) in
later date-events, which suggests that sharper price estimates might be available.
43Appendix 2
Choose e




















We show that for e at least this small, and d sufﬁciently close to 1, no equilibrium
is close to perfect risk sharing. Indeed, we provide an explicit bound on the utility
loss compared to perfect risk sharing.
The argument depends on two bounds: an absolute upper bound (independent
of the discount factor) on the equilibrium debt of the small trader at any date-
event, and an absolute upper bound (independent of the discount factor) on the
equilibrium savings of the small trader on a set of date-events of positive time-
discounted probability. Parts I and II below derive these bounds, and Part III uses
these bounds to provide the desired estimate of the utility loss compared to perfect
risk sharing.
Part I: Debt
Fix a discount factor d and an equilibrium of
3 d. For each date-event s, write
1
￿ fs





￿ fses are the endowments of the large and small traders. Write
xs
￿ ys for the equilibrium consumptions of the large and small traders. Write ds for
the debt of the small trader, so that
￿ ds is the savings of the small trader.























We assert that, independently of the discount factor d, the debt of the small trader
never exceeds VHg
% ke. The argument is in several steps.
44Step 1 Although we wish to bound ds, which is debt at the beginning of date-
event s, it is convenient to work with Ds
￿ ds
% ys
￿ fses, which is debt at the end
of date-event s and Ws
￿ Dsx
￿ g
s , which might be thought of as potential debt. We
show that potential debt is bounded (independently of the discount factor d); this
will yield a bound on debt.
Step 2 Note that xs













￿ es would be feasible for every t with 0
2
t
2 1 and would give greater utility than the equilibrium consumption plan x for
t sufﬁciently close to 1. Hence the equilbrium bond price is determined by the

























Step 3 We now describe the evolution of debt. Fix s
￿ S. The small trader enters s
with debt ds, consumes ys, and ﬁnances his plan by selling endowment and buying











Keeping in mind that xs
% ys














































































































To see this, recall ﬁrst that, by construction, the social endowment is small in
two date-events in s








































































































￿ v. Assume therefore that xA
F xB























Keeping this in mind, and making use of our choice of a and the assumption that
xA
F xB











































































46In particular, either WA
￿ Ws
￿ v or WB
￿ Ws
￿ v, as desired.
Step 5 We assert that potential debt is bounded byV. To see this, suppose not. In
view of Step 4, there is a sequence of successivedate-events along which potential
debt tends to inﬁnity. Hence either there is a sequence of successive date-events
along which consumption of the large trader tends to 0 and debt of the small trader
is non-negative, or there is a sequence of (not necessarily successive) date-events
along which end of period debt of the small trader tends to inﬁnity. The ﬁrst alter-
native is untenable: If consumption of the large trader is small at date-event s then
marginal utility for consumption is large. Since the debt of the small trader is pos-
itive, the savings of the large trader must also be positive. Hence, for sufﬁciently
small l
￿ 0, the large trader would ﬁnd it feasible and preferable to alter his con-










would contradict optimality. On the other hand, the second alternative is also un-
tenable: since endowments are bounded, ifend of perioddebttendstoinﬁnitythen
beginning of period debt must also tend to inﬁnity. But Levine and Zame (1994)
show that, at any equilibrium, debt is bounded.21 We conclude that potential debt
is bounded by V.
Step 6 It follows immediately from the deﬁnition of potential debt that debt of
the small trader is bounded byVHg
% ke. This completes Part I.
Part II: Savings
We choose n
2 1 and show that savings of the small trader





￿ at a set of date-events of time-discounted probability bounded away


















21In general, the bound on debt established by Levine and Zame (1994) will depend on the
discount factor d. The present argument is subtle because we require a bound on debt that is
independent of the discount factor.









￿ 1 if d is sufﬁciently close to 1. We may therefore choose and ﬁx
real numbers c
￿ n













for all d sufﬁciently close to 1.










￿ . Because the initial debt and saving are 0, we can bound savings























































￿ t is the number of times that es








































48Step 3 For each T, consider the set G
￿ T












￿ c for every t







￿ . Because the underlying Markov process is i.i.d. with tran-
sition probabilities equal to 1/4, the usual coin-tossing inequalities guarantee that
we can choose a real number b







It follows that the time-discounted probability of G also exceeds b, independently
of the discount factor d.
Part III: Utility
























￿ K are below 1 whenever the social endowment is low. Arguing
exactly as in the proof of Theorem B, we see that if d is sufﬁciently close to 1, then
the time-discounted probability of P exceeds 1
￿ 1
2b. Because the time-discounted






￿ G, set s1
￿ s; let s2
￿ s
￿1 be the unique date-event in which social
endowment and small trader endowment are both small, let s3
￿ s
￿2 be the unique
date-eventin whichsocialendowmentand smalltrader endowmentare bothsmall,















(ii) at each sk the underlying Markov process is in state 1 (low social endow-
ment, small share for small trader)




￿ e for each k
￿ K
% 1. It follows from (ii) that the
small trader dissaves by at least the ﬁxed amount e at each date-event sk. In view
of (iii), debt must grow by at least the ﬁxed amount e at each date-event sk. Hence,












49However, we have shown that the debt of the small trader never exceedsVHg
% ke,
so this is a contradiction.
We conclude that for each s
￿ P
￿ G there is a date event s








￿ K and ys
￿ eL
2 e. Perfect risk sharing requires the small trader
to consume at least k
￿ 1
2 eL
￿ 2eL in every date-event, so this represents an (un-









￿ G is a set of date-events of time-discounted probability at least b
F 2,
taking into account the possibility of counting some date-events more than once,
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